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THE TRUCK STOPS HERE:  
THE IMPENDING MEXICO-US 
 TRUCKING DISPUTE 
 
Ryan Hynes 
 
Introduction 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is now over 
20 years old. NAFTA was intended to throw open borders between 
Canada, Mexico, and the US, and create an economic powerhouse in the 
process.1  While the success of NAFTA is debatable, US compliance with 
the agreement is not.  For much of its life, the US has violated the terms of 
NAFTA, and imposed a moratorium on Mexican truckers wishing to 
transport goods into the US.  
Mexican trucking companies that wish to import goods into the US 
may do so only in certain defined commercial zones, which are all less 
than 100 miles from the US-Mexico border.2  To travel outside the 
commercial zone, goods must be offloaded from Mexican trucks, and onto 
domestic US carriers.3  This system is wasteful, discriminatory, and 
ultimately, protectionist.  
The US imposes no such restriction on Canadian truckers, citing 
substantial similarities between US and Canadian motor carrier 
regulations.4  This Canadian-Mexican double standard has existed since 
Ronald Reagan lifted requirements for Canadian motor carriers in the 
early 1980s.5  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 
(1993) [hereinafter “NAFTA”]. 
2 What is the Commercial Zone?, FMCSA, http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/faq/what-
commercial-zone (last updated Apr. 16, 2014). 
3 Cindy Skrzycki, The Regulators, THE WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 2, 2009), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/03/02/AR2009030202535.html. 
4 Statement on Signing the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, THE AMERICAN 
PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=43014 (last visited Nov. 
21, 2014). 
5 Klint W. Alexander and Bryan J. Soukup, Obama’s First Trade War,28 BERKELEY J. 
INT’L L. 313 (2010). 
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In 2000, Mexico challenged the US policy in the NAFTA dispute 
panel.6  The NAFTA panel held that the policy was in violation of 
NAFTA’s most favored nation (MFN) principle, and subsequently 
authorized Mexico to cross-retaliate via import tariffs on US 
goods.7  Mexico imposes these retaliatory tariffs on approximately 90 
different US goods, to the tune of $2.4 billion per year.8  
The US has waffled over granting Mexican truckers more freedom 
to operate.  President George W. Bush vowed to live up to our obligations 
under NAFTA, then sat back as enabling legislation stalled in Congress.9 
President Obama has both lifted, and re-imposed the ban on Mexican 
carriers.10 The result of this drawn out fight has been the Federal Motor 
Carrier Safety Administration’s (FMCSA) U.S.-Mexico Cross-Border 
Trucking Pilot Program.11  
The three year pilot program started in 2011 with the goal of 
allowing certain registered Mexican trucking companies to operate outside 
of the commercial zone.12  The pilot was designed to collect data on the 
safety of Mexican truckers and operators, and make a definitive ruling on 
whether safety concerns about Mexican trucks warrant the US 
moratorium.13  Those opposed to opening borders to Mexican truckers, 
like the Teamsters and the Owner Operators Independent Drivers 
Association (OOIDA), have been critical of the program.  They argue that 
it would be dangerous to generalize the results of the program, whose 
participants were self-selected, to the entire Mexican trucking industry, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Chad MacDonald, NAFTA Cross-Border Trucking, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1631, 
1640-1650 (2012). 
7Robert J. Carbaugh, NAFTA and the U.S.-Mexican Trucking Dispute, 4 J. INT’L & 
GLOBAL ECON. STUD. 1, 1-10 (2011). 
8 Mexico Trade Summary, UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
https://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2013%20NTE%20Mexico%20Final.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2014). 
9 See Alexander and Soukup, supra note 5. 
10 Don’t keep on trucking, The Economist (Mar. 19, 2009), 
http://www.economist.com/node/13331117. 
11 Mexico Cross Border Trucking Pilot Program – Operational Updates, FMCSA, 
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/international-programs/mexico-cross-border-trucking-pilot-
program/mexico-cross-border-trucking-pilot (last updated Dec. 3, 2014). 
12 Controversial Agreement: Mexican Trucks to Haul Goods throughout US, THE NEW 
AMERICAN (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/politics/item/9521-
controversial-agreement-mexican-trucks-to-haul-goods-throughout-us. 
13 Mexico Cross Border Trucking Pilot Program, FMCSA, 
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/international-programs/mexico-cross-border-trucking-pilot-
program (last updated Nov. 21, 2014). 
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citing a low participation rate and therefore a lack of statistical 
significance.14  
The program ended October 14th, 2014 without achieving the 
desired number of Mexican trucking participants.  Thus, the FMCSA was 
unable to make a decision on statistically significant data.15  On October 
28, 2014 a committee from the FMCSA met with the DOT Inspector 
General to discuss the program results. 16  Until the DOT issues its final 
decision, the FMCSA has authorized members of the pilot to continue 
operating outside of commercial zones. 
The inconclusive results of the study and the strong, organized 
opposition to such a policy change makes it unlikely that the US will lift 
its moratorium.  Mexico will not react kindly to any failure to change, and 
will immediately reinstate the import tariffs that it voluntarily lifted during 
the program.  After over ten years of back and forth over this issue, and 
exhausting its remedies under NAFTA and the NAFTA Panel, it is almost 
certain that Mexico will bring a claim against the US in the WTO.  Article 
2005 of NAFTA allows a party to bring a claim in either the NAFTA 
courts, or the WTO, and the WTO has a history of settling RTA and PTA 
disagreements.17  
Should the case reach the WTO, the US will almost certainly lose, 
and will in turn face steeper penalties for failing to comply with the terms 
of NAFTA, all to defend an outmoded and prejudicial policy that is 
protectionism hiding under the guise of safety regulations.  This free trade 
double standard is not only detrimental to US reputation as a trustworthy 
trade partner and international leader, but it is also hurting the bottom line.  
 
 
I. The Moratorium is Bad Policy 
At the heart of this dispute and its long history of false starts and 
sudden stops, is outdated, irrational, and simply bad US policy.  As 
Alexander and Soukup point out, the origins of this dispute date back to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 FMCSA’s Mexico Decision Draws Opposition, Support, TRUCKINGINFO (Oct. 15, 
2014), http://www.truckinginfo.com/news/story/2014/10/fmcsa-s-mexico-decision-
draws-opposition-support.aspx. 
15 Data on Cross Border Program Insufficient FMCSA Committee Says, OVERDRIVE 
(Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.overdriveonline.com/data-on-cross-border-program-
insufficient-fmcsa-committee-says-mex-carriers-continue-operation/. 
16 DOT Faces Cross Border Trucking Decision, JOC (Oct. 21, 2014), 
http://www.joc.com/trucking-logistics/truckload-freight/dot-faces-cross-border-trucking-
decision-us-mexico-trade-grows_20141021.html. 
17 See NAFTA, supra note 1, at Ch. 20.  
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the Bus Regulatory Reform Act (BRRA) of 1982, which placed a 
moratorium on the operations of Mexican and Canadian trucks in the 
US.18  President Reagan created an exception for Canada, but not Mexico, 
citing health and safety concerns.19  These perceptions persisted through 
the 90’s and the creation of NAFTA, when Ross Perot was warning of the 
“giant sucking sound” of American jobs to Mexico that NAFTA would 
create.20  Time and economics have proven these accusations false, but the 
perception of Mexico as an unsafe and underdeveloped trading partner 
provides a convenient cover for truly protectionist intent.  Thirty-year old 
concerns over the safety and regulation of Mexican trucks have now 
become an excuse to stifle international trade and competition.  
Interest groups like the Teamsters and OOIDA understandably do 
not wish to jeopardize their monopoly on domestic US shipping. They are 
the first to rattle off the potential environmental and health hazards of 
Mexican trucks.21  The only complication, however, is that their 
allegations are not true.  One of the key findings of the most recent 
FMCSA pilot program is that Mexican trucks are as safe, if not safer than 
their US counterparts.22  
As part of the pilot, Mexican trucks were subject to random 
inspections.  On average, each Mexican truck was inspected 18 times per 
year.23  These inspections revealed that Mexican trucks had a lower 
overall out-of-service rate than their US counterparts.24  That Mexican 
trucks complied with stricter FMCSA requirements while maintaining a 
better out of service rate than US trucks speaks to Mexican motor carriers’ 
ability to adequately meet US safety requirements.  If there was any 
justification for implementing a moratorium in 1982, there certainly is not 
today. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See Alexander and Soukup, supra note 5. 
19 Id.  
20 Ross Perot on Free Trade, ONTHEISSUES, 
http://www.ontheissues.org/celeb/Ross_Perot_Free_Trade.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 
2014). 
21 John Porretto, Teamsters President James Hoffa Blasts Mexican Truck Decision, 
MINDFULLY.ORG (Sept. 8, 2007), http://www.mindfully.org/WTO/2007/Hoffa-Mexican-
Trucking8sep07.htm. 
22 See FMCSA, supra note 11. 
23 Mexico Domiciled Motor Carriers, FMCSA,  http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/international-
programs/mexico-cross-border-trucking-pilot-program/mexico-domiciled-motor-carriers-
17 (last updated Oct. 24, 2014). 
24 Kyle Burns, It’s Time to Implement Cross Border Trucking, INBOUND LOGISITICS 
(Aug. 2010), http://www.inboundlogistics.com/cms/article/its-time-to-implement-cross-
border-trucking/. 
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The moratorium insulates domestic industries from international 
competition and is expensive.  Mexican retaliatory import tariffs totaled 
nearly $2.4 billion dollars in 2007.25  That is not the only cost of the 
moratorium however.  The US is restricting free trade and competition, 
and insulating the domestic trucking industry from international 
competition.  The punitive tariffs imposed by Mexico also make other US 
goods less competitive.26  In this way, the costs of protecting the domestic 
US trucking industry is not borne by that industry, or the US government 
itself, but by the business and industries directly affected by Mexico’s 
punitive tariffs.  
If Mexican motor carriers were allowed to operate outside of the 
commercial zone, the need to offload goods to domestic US carriers would 
be eliminated, saving considerable transportation time and additional 
transaction costs.  Mexican carriers might also compete on price, and offer 
US business more competitive rates on domestic shipping.  Fears that 
Mexican motor carriers will compete for pennies on the dollar are 
overblown however.  
While it is difficult to forecast the effects of completely opening 
US borders to Mexican Trucking, it would not be the doomsday scenario 
that many opponents describe.27  There would be several structural 
barriers to entry that Mexican truckers must still overcome.  Border 
inspections, high insurance costs, language, and uncertainty of a backhaul 
are all obstacles that Mexican truckers would face.28  These challenges 
will likely erode most of the competitive price advantage that Mexican 
truckers have over their US contemporaries. 
 What seems more likely, is that the major determinant of the 
growth of trucking between the US and Mexico will not be price, but the 
growth in trade itself.29  As a larger volume of goods flow between the 
two countries, Mexican shipping will increase.  However, a larger volume 
of trade means that Mexican truckers will not be cutting into US truckers 
business, and a substantial increase in trade will likely increase demand 
for US trucking as well.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Christopher Conkey, Jose De Cordoba, and Jim Carlton, Mexico Issues Tariff List in 
U.S. Trucking Dispute, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Mar. 19, 2009), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123739445919172781. 
26 Id. 
27 Steven Greenhouse, US Delays Opening Border to Trucks from Mexico, NEW YORK 
TIMES (Jan. 8, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/08/us/us-delays-opening-border-
to-trucks-from-mexico.html. 
28 See Carbaugh, supra note 7, at 8. 
29 Id. 
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In short, the BRRA moratorium is an outmoded policy whose 
fundamental assumptions are no longer accurate, and whose effects are 
protecting one industry at the expense of many others.  Not only is the 
current policy hurting domestic US industries, but lifting the policy would 
likely increase in a net benefit due to gains from trade.  This policy has 
also frustrated relations with Mexico, and has given the US a black eye in 
the international trade community.  The moratorium on Mexican trucking 
is the ghost of a bygone era, and needs to be put to rest.  
 
II. This Dispute is Bound for the WTO, Where the US Will 
Lose 
Mexico brought this dispute to the NAFTA arbitration panel in 
2000 and won a retaliatory judgment against the US.30  In the years 
following the decision, Mexico has enforced and suspended its import 
tariffs several times as the US has waffled over lifting the moratorium and 
started, then cancelled multiple pilot programs.31  Should the US fail to lift 
the moratorium after the most recent pilot program, Mexico is not likely to 
entertain US vacillation any longer.32 Mexico will immediately reinstate 
their import tariffs and, having exhausted all other recourse under 
NAFTA, will likely bring a claim against the US in the WTO.  
The interaction between the WTO and RTAs like NAFTA raises 
some interesting questions.  Dispute settlement under the WTO is 
compulsory once a claim has been brought, and while NAFTA Article 
2005 allows parties to bring a claim under NAFTA or the WTO, 
jurisdictional issues still exist.33  In this instance, it is unclear whether the 
NAFTA tribunal or the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”), 
will have jurisdiction on the issue.  As Kwak and Marceau point out,  
“Article 23 of the DSU mandates exclusive jurisdiction in favour 
of the DSU for WTO violations. By simply alleging that a 
measure affects or impairs its trade benefits, a WTO Member is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Final Panel Report, Cross-Border Trucking Services, USA-MEX-98-2008-1 (Feb. 2, 
2001), http://www.worldtradelaw.net/document.php?id=nafta20/truckingservices.pdf. 
31 Mexico Trucking Retaliation, INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, 
http://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/tradedisputes-enforcement/retaliations/tg_ian_002094.asp 
(last updated July 29, 2013) 
32 See William Cassidy, Mexico May Hike Tariffs If Trucking Plan Fails, JOURNAL OF 
COMMERCE (June 30, 2011), http://www.joc.com/regulation-policy/customs-
regulations/mexico-may-hike-tariffs-if-trucking-plan-fails_20110630.html. 
33 See NAFTA, supra note 1, at Art. 2000. 
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entitled to trigger the quasi-automatic, rapid and powerful WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism, excluding thereby the 
competence of any other mechanism to examine WTO law 
violation claims.”34 
Mexico previously argued that the US moratorium violated the 
terms of NAFTA, and brought a complaint under the NAFTA dispute 
resolution procedures.  If Mexico alleges that the US is violating a WTO 
agreement as well as NAFTA, it may then invoke the WTO DSU to 
adjudicate this dispute. 
This collision of jurisdiction raises another procedural question, 
should the WTO be able to hear this dispute, given that the NAFTA panel 
already heard and resolved the issue.  The US will likely argue res 
judicata, and that Mexico’s punitive import tariffs remedy any injury the 
moratorium causes Mexico.35  This argument is unlikely to succeed 
however, because Mexico’s original complaint alleged that the US 
violated the terms of NAFTA, and not a WTO agreement.   To bring a 
case to the DSU panel, Mexico will likely allege that the continued US 
moratorium violates the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
GATS was a result of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, 
and was designed to extend the same protections afforded to goods under 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to services and the 
service sector.36  As such, GATS includes protections such as most 
favored nation (MFN), national treatment, and market access.  MFN 
prohibits WTO members from discriminating against their trading 
partners, and requires all parties to treat one another as if they were their 
most favored trading partner.37  National treatment requires parties to treat 
another country’s goods or services no less favorably than similar 
domestic goods or services.38  Market access compels parties to allow 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Kyung Kwak and Gabrielle Marceau, Overlaps and Conflicts of Jurisdiction Between 
the WTO and RTAS, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (Apr. 26, 2002),. 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/sem_april02_e /marceau.pdf. 
35 Id. at 7. 
36 GATS: objectives, coverage and disciplines, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gatsqa_e.htm#7 (last accessed Nov. 21, 
2014). 
37 Principles of the Trading System, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (last accessed Nov. 21, 
2014). 
38 National treatment, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/national_treatment_e.htm (last accessed 
Nov. 21, 2014). 
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other countries to offer services within the domestic market.39  GATS 
extends powerful protections traditionally enjoyed only by trade in goods 
to the service sector.  
Through the DSU, Mexico will likely argue that the US 
moratorium violates GATS articles II (MFN), XVI (market access), and 
XVII (national treatment).  The disparate treatment of Mexico relative to 
Canada violates the MFN provision of Article II.40  The moratorium itself 
violates the market access protections of Article XVI.41  Finally, the 
moratorium and limited commercial zones give US trucking companies a 
major advantage over their Mexican counterparts, which violates the 
national treatment protections of Article XVII.42 
However, GATS allows for exceptions.   Because GATS affords 
such powerful protections to traditionally domestic industries, countries 
were hesitant to sign on to GATS.43  To pass GATS, the WTO allowed 
countries to make a one-time list of exemptions to the Article II MFN 
provisions of the agreement.  An exemption must list the area of GATS 
and the countries to which it applies, as well as the scope and length of 
time for which the exemption is claimed.44   These exemptions allow a 
country to breach the terms of GATS, provided it is in the scope defined in 
the exemption.45  Exemptions were not intended to last any longer than ten 
years, though in reality they have lasted much longer.46  The WTO also 
required the mandatory, periodical review of exemptions, and 
investigation into whether the circumstances that prompted the exemption 
still exist.47  Once again, this provision has not been treated with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 WTO Agreement: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Apr. 15, 1994, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 
OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 4 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 
I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter “Marrakesh Agreement” or “WTO Agreement”] 
40 GATS: General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE 
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS 284 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter 
“GATS”]. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 See WTO, supra note 36. 
44 Services: rules for growth and investment, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (Nov. 21, 
2014), 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm6_e.htm. 
45 Aaditya Mattoo, MFN and the GATS, INSTITUTE FOR AGRICULTURE AND TRADE 
POLICY (Jan. 1999), http://www.iatp.org/files/MFN_and_the_GATS.htm. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
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gravity that was initially intended, and in practice, exemptions are not 
seriously reviewed or removed.  
The US has hundreds of exemptions to GATS on file.48  One of 
those exemptions covers the 1982 BRRA, which grants the President 
authority to impose a moratorium.  The US states that the exemption 
applies to Canada and Mexico, and is for an indefinite period of time.49  In 
the description of the exemption however, the US states that the 
moratorium does not apply to Canada. Specifically,  
 
“The US government has discretion to limit the issuance of 
trucking licenses to persons from contiguous countries on the 
basis of reciprocity. The Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982 
permits the President to remove or modify in whole or in part the 
moratorium on a finding that such removal or modification is in 
the national interest. Domestic and cross-border trucking 
operations are permitted within designated Interstate Commerce 
Commission commercial zones. The moratorium was lifted for 
Canada in October 1982.”50  
 
This is very strange for an exemption, and while it states that it applies to 
both Canada and Mexico, in the same breath, it removes Canada from the 
exemption.  
This exemption is discriminatory on its face, and should be 
invalidated.  The exemption purports to apply to both Mexico and Canada, 
yet in reality applies only to Mexico.  Its indefinite term also violates the 
general principles of GATS exemptions.51  More importantly, the 
conditions that prompted the exemption, and the moratorium, no longer 
exist.  Preliminary data from the FMCSA pilot shows that Mexican trucks 
and truckers are as safe, if not safer than their US counterparts.52  If there 
ever were legitimate reasons for imposing a moratorium on Mexico, there 
are not any now. Concerns over safety and the environment are thinly 
veiled attempts by us industries to protect themselves from increased 
competition, and are stifling free trade.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 United States of America: Final List of Article II (MFN) Exemptions, WTO Documents 
Online (Apr. 15, 1994), https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-
DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList= 
16552,60254,14206,26635&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=3&FullTextSearch=. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 See WTO, supra note 44. 
52 See Burns, supra note 24. 
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The WTO has never ruled on the legitimacy of an exemption, nor 
has it held that an exemption may be invalidated.  The facts of this case, 
and the US BRRA exemption certainly raise that question however.  When 
faced with new or untouched issues, the WTO typically refers back to its 
core principles of MFN, national treatment, and free trade.53  Given the 
disparate treatment between Canada in Mexico within the text of the 
exemption itself, there is a good chance that the WTO will find the 
exemption invalid.  The WTO must tread lightly however. 
 For all of its success, the WTO’s main weakness is that it is a 
voluntary system that lacks any central enforcement authority.  Should the 
WTO push the envelope too far, there is a chance that the US will simply 
choose to ignore the decision, which would severely damage the 
credibility and authority of the WTO.  The US is easily the WTO’s largest 
member, and there is a risk that the US will be handled with ‘kid gloves’ 
to avoid this very problem.54  Should the US fail to comply, the WTO will 
allow Mexico to retaliate, similar to Antigua and Barbuda in the Online 
Gambling case.55  In that case, the US failed to comply with a DSU 
decision, and the governments of Antigua and Barbuda were allowed to 
retaliate under the Trade in Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPS).56  It 
is difficult to predict how and to what extent the WTO would allow 
Mexico to retaliate against the US, however, cross-retaliation under an 
agreement like GATS would be a larger deterrent than the current punitive 
tariffs, and would spark greater debate domestically.  Hopefully the WTO 
will take this opportunity to establish a precedent of limiting GATS 
exemptions that are blatantly protectionist, and in violation of the basic 
principles of international trade.  
The US – Mexico trucking case raises some interesting questions 
for the WTO, the answers to which are unclear.  First, can the WTO 
decide a case that has already been heard by an RTA arbitration panel, 
even if the claim is brought under a WTO agreement?  More importantly, 
can the WTO invalidate a GATS exemption if the assumptions on which 
that exemption was based are no longer true, and the exemption itself is so 
unfair as to violate the fundamental principles of the world trading 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 See WTO, supra note 37. 
54 United States Trade Profile, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (Sept. 2014), 
http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/ 
WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=US. 
55 See United States -  Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and 
Betting Services, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,  
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds285_e.htm (last accessed Nov. 
21, 2014). 
56 Id. 
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system?  These are thorny issues, but ones of tremendous merit and 
consequence.  Should the US fail to lift the moratorium, the WTO could 
be faced with these questions sooner rather than later. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The US-Mexico trucking saga has gone on long enough.  Outdated, 
protectionist domestic policy has incubated a domestic industry, violated 
the fundamental principle of international trade, and passed the costs of 
doing so onto US exporters, making them less competitive abroad.  Should 
the US fail to lift the moratorium on US trucking, Mexico will be forced to 
bring a complaint against the US under the DSU.  Instead of pandering to 
the size and strength of the US, the WTO should make an example of the 
protectionist policy, and carve out more authority for the GATS 
agreement.  The WTO is Mexico’s last line of defense against a blatant 
violation of international trade, the WTO must send the message that the 
buck stops here.  
